Israel Armoured might -historical perspective

Part1

Perhaps no other conflicts of the period captured the world’s imagination as did the numerous wars in the Middle East. With the notable exception of the 1948–1949 War for Independence, the wars saw the employment of considerable numbers of AFVs and some of the largest tank battles in history. They also proved to be useful laboratories for the Western allies and the Soviet Union concerning the design and employment of AFVs (for the most part, the Soviet Union was the chief supporter and arms supplier to the Arab states; the Western powers, particularly the United States and France, at least until after the 1967 Six Day War, supported Israel).

 The fighting in the Middle East also saw the beginning of a new age, with the first use in warfare of antitank and antiship missiles. In its war to gain independence, Israel initially had only a small armored force, the 8th Armored Brigade, equipped with a hodgepodge of pre–World War II French Hotchkiss light tanks, World War II–era British Cromwells, and U.S. Shermans, the latter purchased from Italy and the Philippines. These faced the far more numerous tanks of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. During the fighting, Israel managed to form a second armored brigade, the 7th. In the war the Israelis utilized their advantages of interior lines, higher morale, better leadership, and more effective command and control to defeat the larger and better-equipped Arab armies. The major Arab problems were in logistics and organization. The Arab armies were spread out (it was 700 miles from Baghdad to Haifa, and Egyptian forces relied on a 250-mile-long supply line across the Sinai Desert), and there was no unity of command or common military strategy.

After 1949 the Israeli Defense Forces invested heavily in tanks, and the Jewish state became one of the most skillful practitioners of armored warfare in history. Working in collusion with France and Britain against Egypt in 1956, Israel Super Shermans and French tanks rolled across the Sinai Peninsula (covering more than 150 miles in only four days) to take that vast desert area from Egypt. In the process Israeli armor defeated a far larger Egyptian force of Shermans, British Centurions, and some JS-3s, in addition to 230 Soviet T-34/85s, as well as a number of armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns. As in the War for Independence, in 1956 it was not superior equipment but rather better training, leadership, and motivation, as well as tactical doctrine and domination of the air, that were vital in the subsequent crushing Israeli victory. Although international pressure, largely from the United States, forced Israel (and Britain and France) to quit Egypt, the war led Israel to go over to a wholly mechanized ground force centered on tanks. The war also brought improved tanks into the Israeli inventory as well as better training.

 In June 1967 Israel used its highly mechanized forces to launch a devastating preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria, and then engage Jordan, in the Six Day War. Israeli tactics were similar to those employed by the Germans in their blitzkrieg of World War II. Tanks would break through the enemy front and then push forward, closely followed by mechanized infantry that would engage enemy forces. This armored thrust was followed by motorized infantry to mop up enemy resistance in order to allow the vital supply column to proceed forward. Rapid Israeli envelopments allowed the numerically inferior Israeli armored forces to take the heavier Arab tanks from the rear and make short work of the Arab armies. Israel had some 264,000 troops, 800 tanks, and 300 combat aircraft; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq had a combined strength of some 541,000 men, 2,504 tanks, and 957 combat aircraft. Of 1,200 Egyptian tanks before the war, 820 were lost. Israeli armor losses amounted to 122 tanks, many of which were repaired and returned to battle. There was also heavy fighting involving Israeli and Syrian tanks in Israel’s conquest of the Golan Heights, although the fighting there did not see the large-scale armor engagements that had marked combat on the Sinai front.

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the tables were almost turned, thanks to Israeli complacency and new Egyptian tactics. Israel had invested heavily in the Bar Lev Line, a static defensive front along the east bank of the Suez Canal, in effect rejecting maneuver tank warfare in which the bulk of armored forces are held back in mobile reserve. The Egyptians also subjected the canal defenses to nearly constant artillery fire, to which the Israelis grew accustomed. On 6 October 1973 (Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement) Egyptian forces struck in force across the Suez Canal while Syrian forces simultaneously invaded the Golan Heights. These offensives caught the Israeli defenders completely off-guard. On the Golan Heights, Syria deployed five divisions and three armored/ mechanized brigades. Their 1,600 tanks included T-34s, T- 54s, and the latest T-62 Soviet tanks. To break through the thick Israeli minefields and defenses, the Syrians also utilized specialized armor vehicles such as flail tanks, bridge-layers, and engineer tanks. Antiaircraft missiles protected the attackers against Israeli aerial intervention. The Israelis initially had only some 50 Israeli Centurion tanks of the 7th Armored Brigade to oppose the Syrian juggernaut. Following the British practice of using secondary armament for ranging purposes, the Centurions scored a high number of long-range, first-round kills. Ordered to prevent the Syrians from breaking through, the few Israeli defenders did just that. At the end of four days of savage fighting, an Israeli force totaling only 177 tanks supported by infantry and artillery defeated a far larger attacking Syrian force centered on 1,400 tanks.

Part 2

With 1,700 tanks and another 2,500 armored vehicles, the Egyptian force on the Suez front was even larger. On the night of 5–6 October, by employing high-pressure water hoses and bulldozers and using bridging equipment, the Egyptians got across the canal and blasted through the sand embankment the Israelis had erected there. By 8 October, protected by a blanket of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Soviet-supplied mobile antiaircraft artillery, the Egyptians had two armies of 100,000 men and more than 1,000 tanks east of the canal. After taking the Israeli positions, the Egyptians were content to set up their own defenses and put into effect their “sword and shield” tactics. The “shield” consisted of a belt of minefields, behind which infantry waited with Soviet-supplied Sagger and Snapper wire-guided antitank missiles. Beyond these, artillery, SAMs, and antiaircraft guns provided security for the defensive belt against the vaunted Israeli Air Force. The “sword” consisted of large tank formations ready to engage and destroy Israeli armored counterattacks.

On 8 October the Israelis unwisely committed two armored divisions in the Sinai to drive the Egyptians back across the canal. The Egyptian chief of staff, General Saad el Shazy, noted that the resulting confrontation saw “the first combat between the essentially World War II concept of armour and infantry weapons of the next generation.” The Egyptians promptly inflicted heavy losses on the attacking Israeli forces. The Israelis at first did not understand why infantry would be standing out in the open—until they released a barrage of shoulder-fired missiles at the tanks. Although in time the Israelis were able to develop means to counter the antitank missiles and SAMs, early in the fighting these new weapons gave the Arab forces the edge, and in two days the Israelis lost some 260 tanks. The Egyptians won the first part of the war, but their success now emboldened President Anwar Sadat, who decided on a deeper penetration of the Sinai. In taking this step, Sadat overruled General Shazy’s arguments that such a step would take his forces beyond the range of SAM cover. The Egyptian offensive began on 14 October and involved more than 2,000 tanks on both sides, making it second in history only to the World War II Battle of Kursk in numbers of tanks engaged. The Israelis brought up reinforcements but were still outnumbered 2:1 in numbers of tanks, a disadvantage that was offset by superior hardware and training and the involvement of the Israeli Air Force. The Israelis not only stopped the Egyptian advance but also destroyed some 500 tanks. Israeli forces now moved toward the canal in an effort to cross over it and take the Egyptian forces from behind and to destroy the SAM sites.

In the process, a large tank battle took place in the area known to the Israelis as the Chinese Farm. The Israelis managed to get some troops and a brigade of paratroopers across the canal, and once a bridge had been thrown across there numbers of tanks followed. The Israelis excelled at rapid maneuver warfare, and they now came up against second-echelon Egyptian troops. The advancing Israeli tanks cut off the Egyptian Third Army at Suez City and were moving north to cut off the Egyptian Second Army when Sadat managed to secure a cease-fire.


Israel won the Yom Kippur War but at a high cost, including the loss of 830 tanks. Sadat had, however, restored Arab pride and went on to visit Israel and conclude a peace settlement with the Jewish state. Many analysts concluded that the Yom Kippur War spelled the end of the tank era: small wire-guided missiles and RPGs had inflicted about a third of Israel’s tank losses. Such a conclusion, however, proved to be premature. The Israelis incorporated the lessons learned in 1973 in their new battle tank, the Merkava. As noted above, crew protection became the priority.
 Merkavas spearheaded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and destroyed the Syrian 1st Armored Division. Although Merkavas took numerous hits from enemy fire, they were not penetrated. Of 50 or so Israeli tankers wounded in the fighting in Lebanon, not one was the result of burns. Although there have been no interstate wars involving Israel since 1982, tanks and other AFVs continue to play a key role in intrastate  operations. Tanks are perhaps the most visible component of Israeli security operations against the second Palestinian intifada (uprising). Despite the proliferation of new antitank weapons and predictions that the day of the tank was over, when the Cold War came to a close with the collapse of the Soviet Union, AFVs were still very much a part of the world’s military establishments.

This post was published in "War and game" site 9/ 2020

Valley of tears- 1973 film

Valley of tears-Golan-1973 Yom Kippur war 

A film taken by Boaz Eliahav  few weeks after the Yom Kippur War 1973

in the Valley of tears in the north of the Golan.

 Boaz served as an officer in the  IDF 7th Brigade 

more about that battle please go to:    Valley of tears 1973 

and   valley-of-tears-golan-1973-yom-kippur

 

IDF Amphibious history

The first amphibious operation made by the IDF was in the 1948 war of independence

Hannah Szenes  Registered name: Andarta Enderta Amorta, was an iron cargo boat                                                                                                                             
in December 14, 1945, Hannah Szenes sailed from Vado Ligure (Savona), under the command of Italian Captain, carrying 211 passengers. AIDMEN (Associazione   Italiana di Documentazione Marittima e Navale) cites Hannah Senesh sailing  from Vado, carrying 252 passengers Palmach Information Center cites Hannah Senesh sailed  from Genoa                                                                                                                                               

On December 25, 1945, Hannah Szenes  beached at Nahariyah, on a stormy night. She listed dangerously and close to capsizing. The passengers landed with the help of Palmach members, men from Nahariyah, and a rope connected from the ship to shore.

Hanna Szenes was refloated, restored in the Haogen shipyard in Haifa. She joined the Sea Service, the beginning of the Israeli Navy. Her ID sign in the Navy was S – 29. 

When the Western Galilee was cut from the rest of the country, during the 1948 war, a unit of regiment 22 of the Carmeli Brigade boarded Hannah Szenes near the Haifa powerstation, and landed in Nahariyah. 

 The unit liberated the Jewish settlements in Western Galilee,evacuated the women and children  from there, brought them to Nahariyah where they embarked on Hannah Szenes and were brought to Haifa. On May 15, 1948 Hannah Szenes came alongside the military jetty in Haifa  the passengers disembarked in front of the British, and she sailed away.      

This was part of Operation Ben Ami - Carmeli brigade seizes Arab strongholds north of Haifa and northeast of Acco (Acre) and establish communications with Yehiam and Hanita. During the operation, Shavei Tzion on the northern seacoast is reached by sea, and Napoleon hill is captured by and the town of Acco (Acre).

 After the war of independence the IDF was building its amphibious force and combined the Tank Corps with the Navel in joined training .

a picture taken in Haifa navy base in the 60's

           

A drill near Akko (Acre) late 50's

A drill Akko (Acre) in the background

IDF Sherman tank in a drill

Moshe Dayan during a visit in Haifa naval base Sinai 1956 War

A.M.X 13 after the 1956 Sinai war

Amphibious Landing at Awali Beach, Lebanon 1982
During the First Lebanon War, IDF forces landed from the sea and deployed deep within Lebanon, hoping to surround PLO terrorists in the south. Paratroopers, armored forces and Shayetet 13 participated in the day-long operation. IDF forces landed behind enemy lines and cut off the enemy’s supplies, which led to the collapse of the PLO in the south. The operation was a great success despite the heavy artillery fired upon the ships by the terrorists.

Trophy intercepts AT missile fired at IDF tank

IDF 401 Brigade around the Gazza strip

An anti-tank missile was fired at an IDF tank along Israel’s border with the Gaza Strip on Wednesday 1.8.2012 just hours after troops exchanged fire with Egyptian soldiers in the South.
The IDF said that the Trophy active protection system which defends against anti-tank missile fire was activated and the incoming projectile exploded although the IDF has yet to determine if the missile was intercepted or detonated prematurely. The attack took place near the Kissufim Crossing in the central Gaza Strip.

The Trophy system is installed on Merkava Mk 4 tanks – used by the 401st Armored Brigade. Using an advanced radar, Trophy is designed to detect and track a threat, and counters it with a cloud of countermeasures that intercepts the incoming anti-tank missile.

Golan Heights 1967 Six Days War

 The Battle of Golan Heights, June 9–10 Syrian-Israeli Front

 False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli armyRetrieved . and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv influenced Syria’s willingness to enter the war.

One of the Syrian tanks in its fortified position at “Tawfik”, dominating Kibbutz Tel Katzir and the settlements on the Sea of Galilee

 08/05/1967 Syrian leadership, however, adopted a more cautious approach, and instead began shelling and conducting air raids on northern Israel. When the Israeli Air Force had completed its mission in Egypt, and turned around to destroy the surprised Syrian Air Force, Syria understood that the news it had heard from Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli military could not have been true.
During the evening of June 5, Israeli air strikes destroyed two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force and forced the remaining third to retreat to distant bases, without playing any further role in the ensuing warfare. A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plant at tel dan (the subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier), Kibbutz Dan  and Shaer Yesuv
 But a broader Syrian offensive quickly failed. Units of Syrian reserves were broken up by Israeli air attacks, and several Syrian tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River. Other problems included tanks too wide for bridges, lack of radio communications between tanks and infantry, and units ignoring orders to advance.

 A post-war Syrian army report concluded “Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not arrive or were not wholly prepared or because they could not find shelter from the enemy’s planes. The reserves could not withstand the air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted. The Syrian command abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began a massive shelling of Israeli towns in the Hula Valley instead.
 On June 7 and June 8, the Israeli leadership debated about whether the Golan Heights should be attacked as well; the attack on Syria was initially planned for June 8, but was postponed for 24 hours. At 3 AM on June 9, Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire.

 Despite this, four hours later at 7 AM, Israel’s minister of defense, Moshe Dayan “gave the order to go into action against Syria.” Syria had supported the pre-war raids that had helped raise tensions and had routinely shelled Israel from the Heights, so some Israeli leaders wanted to see Syria punished.



 Dayan  believed such an operation would yield losses of 30,000 and opposed it bitterly. Levi Eshkol on the other hand, was more open to the possibility of an operation in the Golan Heights, as was the head of the Northern Command, David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for and confidence in the operation may have eroded Dayan’s reluctance. Eventually, as the situation on the Southern and Central fronts cleared up, intelligence estimated that the likelihood of Soviet intervention had reduced,reconnassance showed some Syrian defenses in the Golan region collapsing, and an intercepted cable showed Nasser urging the President of Syria to immediately accept a cease-fire, Moshe Dayan became more enthusiastic about the idea, and he authorized the operation.

Syrian tank in fortified position at “Hirbet Batin” above Ha’on on the Sea of Galilee

View of Kibbutz Daphna and Dan (in background) seen from the “Tel Azaziat” fortifications on the Syrian Heights.

Toddlers with their nurses outside the entrance to underground shelter at Kibbutz Nahal Oz

House at Kibbutz Gadot damaged by Syrian shell fire.

\Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the Kibbutz

Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the kibbutz.

Six Day War. A child’s stroller among the debris of a house at Kibbutz Tel Katzir demolished by Syrian shelling.

The Syrian “Amrat Az Adin” fortified position overlooking Kibbutz Ha’on on the Sea of Galilee

View of Kibbutz Daphna and Moshav Shear Yashuv seen from the “Tel Azaziat” position on the Syrian Heights

View of the fish ponds of Kibbutz Daphna seen from the “Tel Azaziat” position on the Syrian Heights.

 The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armor. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (one armored led by Albert Mendler and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the front at Givat Haem, and another two (infantry and one of Peled’s brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center.
 The Golan Heights’ unique terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several kilometres running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the area channeled both forces along east-west axes of movement and restricted the ability of units to support those on either flank. Thus the Syrians could move north-south on the plateau itself, and the Israelis could move north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected by Mossad operative Eli Choen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions. Syria had built extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers, comparable to the Maginot line

 As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up an effective defense largely because the officers were poor military leaders and treated their soldiers poorly; often officers would retreat to escape danger, leaving their men confused and ineffective.

 The Israelis also had the upper hand during close combat which took place in the numerous Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the Uzi, a light submachine gun, designed for close combat, while Syrian soldiers were armed with the heavier AK  -47assault rifle, designed for combat in more open areas. By the evening of 9 June, the four Israeli brigades had broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.
 However, a battalion of the Israeli 8th Armored Brigade was ambushed after taking a wrong turn. It lost 24 out of its 26 tanks, and casualties amounted to 13 killed and 33 wounded.

 On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in a Pincare mouvment on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces fled. Several units joined by Elad Peled climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions mostly empty as well. During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon cease-fire to occupy strategically strong positions.

To the east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the cease-fire line known as the "Ourole Line"“.
Time Magazine reported: “In an effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire, Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of the city of Quneitra three hours before it actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender of their headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan area.

\Israeli tanks in the Golan Heights . 1967

Israeli army detachment stopping by the water pool at Banias Village on the Golan Heights

P.M. Levy Eshkol (Center) with senior staff officers during a visit to northern command headquarter.

Richard Nixon (Center) visiting Kibbutz Gadot which was under Syrian shell fire until the outbreak of the Six Day War

Hold at all cost-"Tzvika Force" Golan Heights 1973 Yom Kippur War

An article written by Major Michael Wickman  US Army on Armor Magazeen March April 2001

At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces surged across their borders with Israel. The massive surprise attack found Israel outnumbered in vehicles,equipment, and personnel,in some instances, by 50 to 1. Israel’s vaunted air forc was held at bay by a wall of

surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli armored columns were made vulnerable by the Syrians’ excellent use of anti-tank missiles During the first days of the battle, it appeared that Israel’s defenses would be overrun, but due to the heroic efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli

Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn apparent defeat into a sudden rout of the armies of Syria and Egypt. Nowhere was the situation more critical than on the Golan Heights. The purpose of this article is to focus on the bravery and achievements of a few soldiers fighting on the Golan

Heights and their effect on the outcome of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular note are the actions of one Israeli armor officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. The primary objective of Syrian

forces was the recapture of the 480 square miles of the Golan Heights lost to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day War. Syria planned to mount a major breakthrough attempt in the north with

the 7th Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The main thrust, however, was to be farther south in the vicinity of Rafid.This attack was to be carried out by the

5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and elements of the 3rd Armored Division,all concentrated against Israel’s 188th Brigade, which could field only around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called for the occupation of the whole of the Golan Heights by the evening of Sunday,7 October, followed by  reorganization in the area along the River Jordan on Israeli soil in preparation for a further breakthrough into Galilee. Major-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Israel’sNorthern Command, had beenconcerned for some time over the growing concentration of Syrian armored forces. He had expressed his concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th Armored Brigade, which were beingheld in General Headquarters Reserve in the southern part of Israel, to move up to the Golan Heights. This move increased the number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights from an initial number

of some 60 to 170.The Syrian forces arrayed along the Golan Heights consisted of the 7th Infantr Division, the 9th Infantry Division,and the 5th Infantry Division. Each was organized along Soviet lines, with an armored brigade totaling some 130-200 tanks per division. Behind

these first echelon divisions were concentrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions,

each with approximately 250 tanks, along with several independent brigades. The total Syrian force facing Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks supported

by 1,000 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars. The IDF’s plan for defending the Golan Heights was based on two points. First, topography afforded the Israelis well thought-out superior defensive positions. Second,Syrian devotion to the prevailing Soviet operationa level doctrine limited availableopenings for the massive assaults prescribed by that doctrine.An anti-tank barrier was constructed to limit a Syrian armored attack over the 1967cease fire or Purple Line. The purpose of the barrier was to delay the Syrians sufficiently until reserve forces could be committed to reinforce units on the line. Time was the primary issue for both the Israelis and the Syrians. The IDF needed time to deploy reserves before a Syrian breakthrough or, “if politically possible, to mount spoiling attack” as a preemptive measure. The Syrians needed

to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses and reach the edge of the plateau overlooking

the bridges of the River Jordan before the arrival of IDF reserve forces.

This would force the IDF to move their reserves across choke points and up steep narrow winding roads, making a successful counter attack nearly impossible. The Israeli forces defending the Golan Heights were composed of two Israeli armored brigades, the 7th in the northern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in the southern sector, consisting of approximately

170 tanks and some 60 artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces were composed of British Centurions and M51 Shermans.The massive Syrian air and artillery strike against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights achieved tactical surprise.The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th Infantry

Divisions attacked across the Purple Line, while in the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The Syrian 3rd Armored Division, committed

to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infantry Division, also suffered heavily and gained little ground. In the south, the Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions,taking advantage of the less restrictive

terrain, broke through the defenses of the Barak Brigade. In two days of fighting,the Barak Brigade was virtually destroyed, and the command post at Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th

Infantry Division “had split the Israeli defensive forces, and now threatened the command center at Nafakh. The remnants of the Barak Brigade were barely hanging on and were in desperate need of reinforcements. The collapse of the northern sector could have forced the IDF to fall back to the Jordan River and therefore changed the outcome of the war. The original plan of reinforcing with reserve brigades was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius and the west bank of the River Jordan,they were immediately sent forward in small groups into battle.At this time, something just short of a miracle was underway at Nafakh. Frantically trying to reach the Golan by any means possible was [Lieutenant] Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been on a fortnight’s leave.” Lieutenant Greengold had been safely at home, near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He had just been released from service with the Barak Brigade and was on leave for two weeks prior to attending a company commander’s course. He was one of the first soldiers to make his own way back to the battlefield. At the Nafakh headquarters of the Barak Brigade, the commander, Colonel Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot reports coming in from his battalion commanders on the size of the Syrian attack. While he was deciding his next moves, he was approached by Lieutenant Greengold, who arrived to find Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no troops nor tanks to command, assisted with the removal of the dead and wounded from disabled vehicles. He soon learned that four tanks, three of which had been battle-damaged, were about to arrive. Zvika requested and received command of the four tanks.He was delighted. Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to take the four tanks and move towards the Tapline Route, a major Syrian avenue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold and his four tanks were to be known on the brigade communications network as Force Tzvika.

 Captain Tzvika Greengold in 1973

Tzvika Greengold 2010

By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham was greatly concerned by the Syrian advances in the southern sector, where the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and was bypassing the Israeli

fortifications in the vicinity of the Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage nighttime firefights were taking place across the southern Golan Heights, and Israeli troops were cut off in their frontline fortifications. Transmissions to their headquarters at Nafakh finally produced authorization to withdraw, but this was easier said than done, with Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a relieving tank force broke through to Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian forces in the immediate vicinity, and succeeded in evacuating all the men.

Along the southern flank, where the battle was then heaviest, the fight was more difficult. Israeli tanks fought through and relieved Bunker 114 and Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was completely

surrounded. Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight in their defenses and called for artillery support. The only available artillery was a single battery of 155mm guns, which was ordered to concentrate on Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission was extremely effective and provided

temporary relief to the troops inside. Because of the penetration in his sector along the Tapline Road, Colonel Ben-Shoham attempted to move the forward headquarters (one tank and onehalftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh to Juhader, where he believed he could

better control the battle. He moved carefully along in the dark, avoiding Syrian formations, and his staff was relieved to reach Juhader. By then, they were under constant heavy shelling,

due to poor IDF communications discipline and successful Syrian SIGINT operations. The Syrians obtained radio fixes every time a communications officer tried to contact his subordinate commanders. In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had left Nafakh several hours before, was moving cautiously along the Tapline Route. Zvika had been intent on joining

Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika promptly sent a contact report to Colonel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. Zvika took advantage of the terrain and limited visibility, moving his force into hull-down positions and letting the enemy come to him. Zvika’s force waited only a short time until one of his tank commanders reported contact with an approaching Syrian column consisting mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the gloom and saw them by the dim glow of their “formation lamps and infra-red ‘cats eyes’.At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a solitary Syrian tank on the road about four kilometers outside Nafakh and only ten meters from his own Centurion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of being seen or set ablaze in the horrendous flash of burning fuel and munitions, Zvika ordered his driver to back up fast. He then found that he had no way of communicating with the other tank or of even speaking with his own crew. The shock of the explosion of the Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down to the roadway and stalked over to the other Centurion, ejecting its commander and motioning him to climb aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” he cautioned the other man, “and do as I do, if possible.Zvika then continued to work his way south along the Tapline Road, the two tanks moving slowly forward, using the terrain to mask their movement. Zvika soon realized that he was alone, the other tank having lost its position in the dark. Moving over the crest of a hill,Zvika was confronted by three Syrian tanks moving towards them with their driving lights on. Three rapid shots from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and the illumination of the area from the fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. The intruders belonged to the 51st Independent Tank Brigade, and they were feeling their way into the Israeli rear, seeking to exploit the breakthrough. Apparently they had turned on their sidelights to see better, to gain speed.Zvika shifted into a new position and within minutes destroyed three more T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline Road was a major avenue of approach,that he was frequently outnumbered and he was facing tanks with superior night fighting capabilities. Zvika chose to hold in his current position, take advantage of the defensible terrain, and wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes passed until they were alerted by the sound of heavy engines. A long column of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, followed by a procession of trucks. “It was as if the main body of Major Ismail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on

parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced was the column. Zvika waited until the lead tank was

only twenty meters from where he was hunkered down. The first shot stopped the first target and stalled the entire column Zvika was up against terrible odds, but he had the enemy fixed and was in position to destroy the entire column. Zvika withdrew into the darkness, taking advantage of the scrub and rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire before disappearing again. He kept this uneven match going for over an hour.The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash and a long jet of white flame shooting through the night to destroy another of their vehicles. The Syrians were extremely bewildered by the single shot that kept hitting their tanks from all along the roadway. Frustrated, several Syrian tankers switched on searchlights to try and locate what they thought was a sizeable enemy force. The illumination gave Zvika and his gunner more clear targets to engage. Ten armored vehicles were either destroyed or damaged before Major Ismail ordered the remnants of his battalion to withdraw.

What the Syrians believed was a sizable force was actually the work of a single tank crew.

Several miles further along the Tapline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben-Shoham realized he was surrounded. His brigade intelligence officer suggested that as it was impossible to get

back to the Nafakh headquarters by the Tapline Road, they had better cut across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham directed his tank and the headquarters’ half-track to head west toward the ridge of the Golan Heights near Ramat Magshimim. At approximately 0200 on October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a primary objective of the Syrian forces. They were dismayed to observe new Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along

the escarpment, and in full view of Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces would soon cross into Israel proper. The Israeli tank and its accompanying half-track continued to move along in

dim moonlight, keeping among the boulders on the slopes to screen themselves

from the large Syrian force moving parallel to their position. Colonel Ben-Shoham tried to determine the status of his brigade, and feared that very little remained. Meanwhile back in

Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More

received permission from the CinC of Northern Command to leave the base and take command of the tanks along the Tapline Route. He was to fight a delaying action along the Tapline

Route to slow the Syrian advance towards Nafakh Camp. This force included Zvika’s small group and two reserve tank platoons of the Northern Command Reserve, which were the

only reserves available in the southern sector. Lieutenant Colonel More received

the order from Colonel Ben- Shoham to mount a counterattack, and proceeded southwards along the Tapline Route, while Tzvika and a platooof tanks drove parallel along the road’s wire fences. Almost immediately, the first tank in Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvikaordered one of the remaining tanks forward to rescue the crew of the burning Centurion. He positioned his own tank to cover in the flank, and both tanks were hit. Zvika’sgunner was injured, while Zvika himself reeled from the shock of the blast and searing pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled from their blazing Centurion, falling to the ground in flames and screaming as flames seared their faces and hands. Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning,

but he rolled into a ditch and somehow smothered the flames. He was fearful that at any moment his tank, still carrying fuel and ammunition, would blow up. Not realizing the extent of his wounds, he ran towards another tank, shouted garbled instructions, and took command of the vehicle. He then activated the communications system, announcing to all that TF Zvika was still in existence Even as Colonel Ben- Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment faded on the radio, Zvika realized the extent of his wounds, and the terrible burns on his face and hands began to throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben-Shoham’s calm but insistent voice brought him back to reality. Moving straight for him were two Syrian tanks, bearing down with their guns firing. Zvika fired and screamed for his driver to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tracks tore around on the bare rocks, then raced backward into the inferno of the night, its crew still battling against the heavy odds.

The remainder of Colonel Ben-Shoham’s counterattack force also made contact with the mechanized infantry that had been accompanying the tanks that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks were hit and disabled, one at a time. When More saw a Syrian soldier aim an antitank rocket at his command tank,he grabbed hold of his free machine gun and opened fire. However, his machine gun jammed and the Syrian grenadier let fly. More was thrown from his tank and lost an arm and an eye in the blast.  Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the chain of command the failure of his counterattack and did his best to stabilize the situation. With minimal resources he calmed the nerves of his commanders, called for artillery support, and attempted to maintain situational awareness of the battle that surrounded.

In order to improve command and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham requested the command of all forces in the southern Golan from the regional commander. It was apparent that the

Syrians were swarming all over the southern sector of the Golan Heights. In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade was defending positions in and around Booster Ridge against the Syrian

7th Infantry Division, elements of the 3rd Armored Division, and a brigade of Moroccan troops. Fighting from prepared positions, the Centurionequipped 7th Armored Brigade held out

against odds sometimes as high as 15 to 1. Under constant artillery and air attack,

Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored Brigade commander, calmly directed his dwindling forces, maintaining a reserve which he moved from ambush to blocking position to battle position

during 72 hours of continuous fighting. The 7th Armored Brigade, although down to a handful of operational tanks,never gave up their primary positions.In the southern sector, the crisis continued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of October revealed that the Syrians had

achieved a major breakthrough in the southern sector of the Golan Heights. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and 47th Independent Tank Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division had made a major penetration along the Rafid El-Al road.The Syrians exploited this penetration

with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks. Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the advancing second-echelon Syrian columns, and chose to regroup his forces and attempt to delay the Syrian penetration. His tank and half-track sped back

towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG fire along the entire route. Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route. He decided his best course of action would be to rally his meager forces and join his deputy, Colonel Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade (now reaching the front

in small numbers). “Every three tanks now reaching the front were assembled into make-shift

platoons, patched into the communications network and rushed towards Ben- Shoham’s position. All in all, two companies were pieced together, and the newly formed units reached Nafakh and re-established the Barak Brigade’s headquarters. At approximately 1145, Major Baruch Lenschner identified a lead element from the Syrian 1st Armored Division

as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an independent Northern Command battalion, was commanding a hastily assembled force of initially 14 Centurions. That was now down to two operable tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of

the 91st Armored Brigade and stated that his position was untenable. Colonel Ben-Shoham urged the young major to hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and his small force were not heard from again. It was later determined that Major Lenschner perished when the warhead

of a Sagger missile punched through the Centurion’s turret armorand his force was overrun.15 Outflanked, the brigade headquarters at Nafakh was now under attack. Ben- Shoham was ordered to return to Nafakh for the base’s defense, and ordered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel

Yisraeli to set out and cover his force. Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham, Zvika had met up with Colonel Yisraeli’s force at dawn and fought in the battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank rigade’s attack along the Tapline Route. Just when Zvika had thought they were gaining the upper hand, Yisraeli frantically ordered his force back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ outflanking movement. Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben- Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syrian artillery and tank fire. Both he and Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more

than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles. As the battle raged and Syrian tanks approached to close range, Yisraeli’s gunner announced that the tank was out of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his

driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with machine guns blazing. Within moments,

his tank in flames, Lieutenant-Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Shoham, unaware of the fate of his deputy, continued to issue orders. Standing upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham observed

the battle, firing at Syrian crewmen fleeing their burning vehicles. As he searched the hills for Syrian commandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killedColonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con-

“Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route.”tact with his commanders, Zvika left the roadway and approached Nafakh cross-country from the southeast without encountering Syrian forces, but just missing a Syrian ambush. The 91st Armored Brigade continued its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooperman, deputy commander of the District (administrative) Brigade, organized Nafakh’s defenses and issued antitank weapons to soldiers manning the perimeter. Standing at the southern perimeter fence, he watched the advance of approximately two Syrian tank companies, and ordered the advanced headquarters group to withdraw from Nafakh. As this force left the base, hundreds of Syrian shells rained down on the camp. Syrian tanks were now entering Nafakh unhindered, firing pointblank at the base’s evacuated buildings, raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieutenant- Colonel Cooperman grabbed the division’s deputy intelligence and operations officers, a bazooka and six shells,and rushed to try and stop the Syrians from taking Nafakh. Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing at long range, the 679th managed to hold the Syrians and push them out of Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still

inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, now out of ammunition, was cornered by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun turned towards them, the tank went up n a ball of flame. Approaching the rescued officers was a battered tank moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just as the Syrians were breaking in, he had joined forces with a reserve tank, and with more enthusiasm than good sense his exhausted crew attacked the Syrians.

“Zvika fired wildly at everything in sight — at the hills and the fences and at the Syrian tanks that had already flattened the perimeter fence. The truth was that his tank driver was in the

shock of exhaustion and could no longer react to orders after twenty hours of continuous, nerve-twisting battle. During the pandemonium, Zvika attached himself to the 679th Armored

Brigade and with them forced the Syrians out of the ruined camp and back

onto the Tapline Road. The Syrian advance had been stopped at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking wreckage of their tanks, personnel carriers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the

camp and on the dun-colored hills. “When the battle around Zvika ceased,he found himself standing in the turret of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly unable to make a decision as to what to do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence officer — now the nominal brigade

commander — rushed up to greet the lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelming

lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed from the turret and carefully dropped to the ground, where he leveled his eyes on the intelligence officer and apologetically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ The intelligence officer said not a word; he hugged Zvika close and led him to the medical evacuation center. There is no way to calculate the damage that that iron-willed redheaded youth inflicted upon the best plan with which Syria has ever entered a conflict.

To say that the actions of Lieutenant Zvika Greengold directly affected the

outcome of the Yom Kippur war would be an overstatement. But it goes without

saying that his actions greatly aided the successful defense of the Golan

Heights. “For his incredible 24 hours on the Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was

awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme

valor.

MAJ Michael D. Wickman, commissioned

in Armor from OCS, has

served as a mortar platoon leader

in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon

leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany.

He served as a tactical intelligence

officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Division,

and assistant J2, Task Force

Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served

as S2, S4, and tank company commander

in 1-94 Armor. He is a

graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC,

and CAS3.


                                          Rare home 8 mm film made by a IDF reserve soldier
                                          in south of the Golan during the Yom Kuppur War
                                          including a Syrian Mig 17 crash near the force
                                          during battle

IDF command half track hit during the battle

Iraqi tanks hit by the IDF in shouth of the Golan

1967 מבצע "מוקד"- מלחמת ששת הימים Moked Operation 1967 Six Days War

"Moked" Operation 1967 Six Days War

 the opening air strike by Israel at the start of the Six Days War of 1967. It is sometimes referred to as "Sinai Air Strike" since the focus was primarily on airfields around the Sinai At 07:45 on June 5, 1967, the  (IAF) under Maj. Gen. Hod launched a massive air strike that destroyed the majority of the Egyptian  air force on the ground. By noon, the Egyptian , Jordan and Syrian Air Forces , with about 450 aircraft, were destroyed. It was also very successful in disabling 18 airfields in Egypt, hindering Egyptian Air Force operations for the duration of the war.

 

 

Summary of the operation

 

In three main waves of aerial attacks, and several smaller waves in the days following the operation, a total of 452 aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. This left the IAF in almost complete control the skies , and able to effectively assist the Israel Defnce Force (IDF) ground units.
The operational success was achieved by concentrating on the initial destruction of the runways with a new rocket assisted bomb that would come to be known as the Durandal  anti-runway warhead. As designed, after release of the bomb, a parachute is deployed to point the warhead directly toward the runway being attacked; at a set altitude, the rocket ignites and drives the warhead through the pavement of the runway before it detonates. The explosion creates a small crater over a large new sinkhole, meaning the damaged runway must be removed before the hole can be filled. Once the runways were disabled, entire air bases' complements of aircraft were effectively grounded and fell victim to subsequent attack waves, resulting in near-total Israeli air supremacy 

June 5, 1967

Operation Moked was launched at 7:45 am Israeli time (8:45 Egyptian time). Nearly all of Israel's 196 combat aircraft (mostly French/Dassault) were committed to the airstrike, with only twelve being held back to patrol Israeli airspace.
Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with shelters able of protecting Egypt's warplanes in the event of an attack. The Israeli warplanes headed out over the sea before turning toward Egypt. Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively shutting down their entire  aur defence  system: they were worried that rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal Amer  and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there. In this event it did not make a great deal of difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover and well below the lowest point at which Egypt's SA-2  surface-to-air missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.
The first Israeli wave attacked 11 bases, catching much of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and destroying them before they got airborne. The Israeli jets then returned to Israel, were "quick-turned" (refueled and re-armed) in 7 minutes 45 seconds, and left in a second wave that attacked 14 Egyptian bases and returned with only minor losses. They "quick-turned" again and departed in a third wave.
The opening stages of Operation Moked were a complete success: Egypt's air force of nearly 500 combat aircraft was destroyed in the space of three hours, with only minor losses to the Israeli Air Force. When Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacked Israeli targets in retaliation for the airstrike on Egypt, their attacks were mainly directed at civilian targets^[ and were largely ineffectual. In response many of the IAF planes headed for a third strike on Egypt were diverted en route to Syrian and Jordanian targets, and other IAF aircraft were sent against Arab ground forces in support of Israeli ground forces.

June 6-10, 1967

On the second day of the war (June 6) the IAF was used against Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi ground forces.
On the third day (June 7) the IAF destroyed hundreds of Egyptian vehicles trying to flee across the Sinai in convoys and trapped thousands more in narrow Sinai passes. By the end of the third day Jordan's air force of 34 combat aircraft had essentially ceased to exist and the Jordanian military was no longer in the fight.
By the sixth and final day (June 10) Syria had lost approximately 100 combat aircraft and the fighting was over.

Aftermath

During the Six Days War , the IAF , with 196 combat aircraft at its disposal had prevailed over a coalition with approximately 600 combat aircraft. The IAF destroyed 452 enemy aircraft, including 79 in air combat, while losing 46 of its own. 24 Israeli pilots and an unknown number of Arab pilots were killed.

Number of aircraft destroyed by country

• Egypt : 338 aircraft
• Syria : 61 aircraft
• Jprdan : 29 aircraft
• Iraq : 23 aircraft
• Lebanon : 1 aircraft
• Israel  lost 19 aircraft in the operation.

General Mordechai "Moti"  Hod

  The most famous period of Mordechai Hod's career came in June 1967. Since the beginning of the year were still evident aggressive plans for the Arab countries towards Israel. 14th May joined the Egyptian army into the demilitarized zone on Mount Sinai and UN troops are deployed to the forced withdrawal. In addition, the 22nd May Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran to all shipping traffic, leading to the Israeli port of Eilat. These acts were flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement concluded in 1956, despite the fact that the armies of Arab war preparations clearly showed that more Arab aggression is only a matter of time.
The Israeli government has therefore adopted a decision to carry out preventive air strike against the air forces of the neighboring Arab countries.

On Monday, 5 morning in June 1967 started the first 38 aircraft and 141 aircraft subsequent waves, which attacked the nine air bases in Egypt and was discontinued within 45 minutes of the runway and on the ground and the air had destroyed nearly 150 Egyptian military aircraft. Mordechai Hod later called it "the longest 45 minutes of my life." After these 45 minutes, but could the chief of General Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, without any pathos historical statement said: "The Egyptian Air Force no longer exists."

After the efforts of the IDF / AF turned against Syria, Jordan and Iraq to the end of the day came back to finish their work in Egypt. In one day proved to the IAF on the status of 197 combat aircraft, 474 combat during takeoffs knees air forces of four Arab countries and destroy their 374 aircraft (286 in Egypt, Syria 52, Jordan 27 and 9 in Iraq). Over the next five days, the Israeli army occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, the entire West Bank (today's West Bank), including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The conflict from the perspective of history gone down in history as the " Six Days War ", from the standpoint of military strategy as a prototype of the art" parallel war ", who later triumphed in the Allied Operation Desert Storm in 1991.


The film you are about to see was edited by Al Jazeera tv a anti Israeli
station never the less the facts are real, the insight is from the Arab
point of view