With Syrian tanks overrunning the Golan Heights' southern sector, only selfless acts of bravery by the 188th Barak Brigade prevented the Syrians from capturing the heights and threatening the entire north of Israel.
Defeat seemed to be imminent for the state of Israel. The Syrians' Soviet-style massive frontal assault was too much to bear, and the Israeli front lines had already collapsed. The Israeli general in charge of the entire front had abandoned his nearly surrounded headquarters (HQ) and retired to a makeshift command post a few kilometers back. With two Syrian brigades advancing on the headquarters and no Israeli reserves in sight, defending the headquarters--left in the hands of infantrymen supported by only two trackless tanks mustered from the camp's repair depot--seemed almost futile.
On October 6, 1973, during Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, a Syrian armored force of 1,400 tanks backed by more than 1,000 artillery pieces and supporting air power began a coordinated assault along the 36-mile-long Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights in the north of Israel. That attack coincided with a similar onslaught by Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal, suddenly forcing Israel to fight a two-front war.
Israeli defense doctrine relies on the standing army to hold the line with air support while the reserves are mobilized. Therefore, the two Israeli brigades that stood in the Syrians' way in the Golan had the daunting task of holding off the onslaught long enough for Israel's reserve mobilization to kick in. The 7th Armored Brigade's epic defense of the northern Golan has come to be widely regarded as one of the finest defensive stands in military history. Less publicity has been given to the heroism of the shattered fragments of the 188th (Barak) Brigade in slowing the Syrian advance in the south. In some respects, however, the Barak Brigade's story is more incredible, considering the fact that hundreds of Syrian tanks had overrun its sector and were held off by only a handful of tanks.
The 1973 conflict was as much about honor as it was about real estate. In the Six-Day War of June 1967, Israel had seized the Golan Heights, which Syria had turned into one large network of bunkers and artillery positions. For years, Syrian gunners, shooting at random and without provocation, would fire on Israeli fishermen plying their trade on the Sea of Galilee or at Israeli farmers in the Hula Valley below. In a costly uphill battle, the Israelis swept out the Syrian defenders and put an end to the harassment. The loss of the Golan Heights in 1967, however, had been humiliating to Syria.
Between 1967 and 1973, there were frequent skirmishes along the cease-fire line. For months leading up to its attack, the Syrian army had been fully mobilized and on war alert. Since the Israelis were accustomed to seeing those forces at battle strength, the Syrians were able to make final attack preparations without sending noteworthy warning signals. Furthermore, with tensions escalating between the two countries, Israeli leadership feared that strengthening its defenses might be misconstrued as preparation for a pre-emptive strike, thus provoking the Syrians to attack.
The Golan Heights are made up of a 480-square-mile volcanic (basalt) rock plateau perched above the Hula Valley to the west and Jordan Valley to the south. It rises gently from 600 feet in the south to 3,000 feet in the north, with abrupt escarpments dominating the valleys to the west and south. It is transected in some areas by impassable canyons, limiting the number of routes leading up from the valleys to the heights. Since the heights' geography restricted defensive mobility, Israel continued its advance against the routed Syrians in 1967 until a defensible line was reached--a string of extinct volcano cones that commands strategic views of Damascus on one side and of all northern Israel on the other.
Israeli defenses were based on 17 fortified observation posts. The Purple Line, as the 1967 cease-fire line was known, marked the end of the no man's land separating Syria from the Golan. Lacking a true defensive barrier, the Israelis had dug a 20-mile-long anti-tank ditch along the border from Mount Hermon to Rafid, an obstacle Syrian armor would be forced to cross under fire from Israeli tanks positioned behind ramparts. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, the Golan Heights were defended by two armored brigades: the 7th, which had only been dispatched to the northern sector on October 4, and the 188th (Barak) Brigade, a regular fixture intimately familiar with the area's terrain, in the south. The modified Centurion and M-48 Patton tanks fielded by both brigades were fitted with the 105mm NATO gun and modern diesel engines.
Considering the faulty Israeli intelligence assessment that, at most, armed skirmishes with the Syrians would break out, the 170 tanks and 70 artillery pieces in the Golan were thought to be enough to meet any Syrian threats, at least until the reserves would arrive.
Against that comparatively small force, the Syrian army fielded five divisions for its attack: two armored and three mechanized infantry, including some 1,400 tanks. Approximately 400 of those tanks were T-62s, the most modern Soviet-bloc tank at the time, equipped with a 115mm smoothbore gun and infrared night-fighting capability. The balance were T-54s and T-55s armed with 100mm guns. The Syrian plan called for its 5th, 7th and 9th mechanized infantry divisions, in BTR-50 armored personnel carriers (APCs) supported by 900 tanks, to breach the Israeli lines, opening the way for the 1st and 3rd armored divisions to move in with their 500 tanks to capture the entire Golan Heights before Israel had a chance to mobilize.
At 2 p.m. on October 6, Syrian gunners opened up a tremendous barrage along the entire front as a prelude to their two-pronged attack--a northern one in the vicinity of the Kuneitra-Damascus road and one in the south where Rafid bulges into Syria.
Facing Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal's 7th Armored Brigade in the Golan's northern sector were the Syrian 3rd Armored Division under Brig. Gen. Mustapha Sharba, the 7th Mechanized Infantry Division and the Assad Republican Guard. When the Syrian assault began, mine-clearing tanks and bridge-layers led the way to overcome the Israeli obstacles. Naturally, those engineering vehicles were the 7th's first targets, but Syrian infantrymen, braving intense fire from the heights, rushed forward and used their entrenching tools to build up enough earthen causeways for their tanks to negotiate the Israeli anti-tank ditches.
While the Israelis took out every Syrian vehicle they could get into their sights, the sheer mass of some 500 enemy tanks and 700 APCs advancing toward their lines ensured that the defenses would be overwhelmed. The number of defenders dwindled as Israeli tanks were knocked out, yet the vastly outnumbered Israelis managed to take a heavy toll on Syrian armor. In spite of their heavy losses, the Syrians pressed their attack without letup, yet the overexerted 7th managed to hold its ground, throwing stopgap blocking actions wherever the Syrians were on the verge of breaking through.
When darkness fell, the Israelis had nothing to match the Syrians' night-vision gear and had to allow the enemy armor to advance to ranges effective for night fighting. In the close fighting, the Syrians succeeded in seizing some of the high ground, but a counterattack by the small group of persistent defenders forced them back. When some Syrian tanks did overrun the Israeli lines, the 7th's gunners would rotate their turrets to destroy them and then immediately turn their attention back to other oncoming tanks. It amounted to an armored version of hand-to-hand combat.
The battle raged for two more days as the Syrians, seemingly oblivious to their heavy losses, continued their assault without letup. By the afternoon of October 9, the 7th Brigade was down to six tanks protecting what was for all intents and purposes a clear path into Israel's north.
Those last few tanks fought until they were down to their last rounds. Then, just as the 7th Brigade tanks were finally starting to pull back, they were suddenly augmented by an impromptu force of some 15 tanks. The Syrians believed the clock had run out and that the first of the fresh Israeli reservists had arrived, and the Syrian offensive ran out of steam. In truth, it was a motley force of repaired tanks crewed by injured and other crewman, which had been mustered by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan, a veteran commander who, upon hearing about the outbreak of war, had hurried home from his honeymoon overseas. By virtue of its timing, that force proved to be the 7th Brigade's saving grace. As individual tanks began to augment the Israeli forces, the Syrians, exhausted from three days of continuous fighting and unaware of how close to victory they actually were, turned in retreat. Hundreds of destroyed tanks and APCs littering the valley below the Israeli ramparts were testimony to the horrible destruction that had taken place there, leading an Israeli colonel to dub it the "Valley of Tears."
Meanwhile, the Syrians, whose objectives included seizing the bridges spanning the Jordan River (most of which could be easily reached through the southern Golan), concentrated a large part of their attack in that sector. Up against hundreds of enemy tanks in a line of armor as far as the eye could see, the Barak Brigade crews had no choice but to hold fast, because the terrain did not allow for much defensive maneuvering. Retreat would give the Syrians nearly free reign to seize the entire heights and move on the Israeli settlements in the valley below.
The Syrian advance was initially slowed by an Israeli minefield and by deadly, accurate cannon fire. With dozens of Syrian tanks destroyed, the first few hours of the war were encouraging for the Israeli crewmen--their intense training was paying off. Knowing they would be outnumbered in any engagement, the Israeli tankers had trained relentlessly on gunnery skills and rapid target acquisition to ensure kills on the first shot. Undeterred by their losses, however, the Syrians kept coming, apparently convinced that, if worst came to worst, the mass of their onslaught would ultimately overwhelm the defenders.
When fighter aircraft were called in to help stem the flow of Syrian armor, many of the Douglas A-4 Skyhawks and McDonnell F-4E Phantoms that responded to the plea were shot down or damaged by the Syrians' dense anti-aircraft umbrella. Aware that Israeli doctrine relied on air power to even the score against the Syrian numerical advantage, the Syrians had acquired massive quantities of the latest Soviet missile and anti-aircraft systems. With the help of Soviet advisers, they created an air defense network over the Golan that was thicker than the one protecting Hanoi during the Vietnam War.
With their air support thus limited, the tankers were on their own--and the fate of northern Israel was in their hands. The Israeli tanks stood their ground and were knocked out one by one. Pushed beyond their limits, the defenses in the southern sector broke.
Bypassing the Israeli fortifications and pouring through gaps in the defenses, Syrian tanks pushed through the Israeli lines onto a wide-open plain that was ideal for tanks. The Iraelis knew that they had to hold on at all costs to allow time for the reserves to mobilize, and in many cases the tank crews sacrificed themselves rather than give ground. As the hours passed, fewer and fewer Israeli tanks were left to stem the tide of oncoming tanks. The Syrian force split into a two-pronged advance. Colonel Tewfik Jehani's 1st Armored Division moved northward toward the Golan command headquarters of Maj. Gen. Rafael Eitan, situated on the road leading down to the Bnot Yaakov Bridge, over the Jordan River and into the Israeli hinterland. The second prong of the Syrian attack, spearheaded by the 46th Armored Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, moved south from Rafid on the southern access road toward El Al, with units breaking off toward the north in the direction of the Arik Bridge at the northern tip of the Sea of Galilee. Some 600 tanks were now engaged in the southern Golan, against which stood 12 tanks and isolated units that had been cut off near the various fortifications along the line.
Night offered no respite from the Syrian advance as they capitalized on their advantage of sophisticated night-vision equipment. The Israeli crews' long-distance firing efficiency was hampered by their lack of adequate night-fighting equipment. They did their best to overcome this obstacle by ordering illumination rounds to light up the sky, in conjunction with the xenon light projectors mounted on their tanks. Those were no match for the Syrians' infrared searchlights, so the Israelis did what they do best--improvise. They directed small tank units to carry out stopgap blocking actions against the far superior enemy forces--a tactic that may have prevented the Syrians from overrunning the entire Golan.
One of those lethal holding actions that have become legend was led by a young lieutenant named Zvi Gringold, affectionately known as "Lieutenant Zvicka," whose hit-and-run tactics are credited with single-handedly holding at bay a major thrust by almost 50 tanks. His guerrilla-style tactics on the route leading toward his brigade's HQ caused the Syrians to believe they were up against a sizable Israeli force. After more than 10 of its tanks were destroyed, the Syrian column withdrew, its commander deciding to hold off and deal with the Israeli force in daylight. Gringold continued to engage the Syrians throughout the night and following day, destroying upward of 30 tanks, until injuries, burns and exhaustion caught up with him and he was evacuated. Gringold recovered and was subsequently awarded Israel's highest decoration, Ot Hagvura, for his heroic defense of Nafakh.
Another blocking force operating in the south, albeit attached to the 7th Brigade, was "Force Tiger" under Captain Meir Zamir. Force Tiger's seven tanks were sent to block a column of some 40 Syrian tanks that had broken through at Rafid and was heading north--a move that threatened to cut off and isolate the 7th Brigade. Force Tiger laid an ambush that succeeded in destroying half the Syrian tanks during the wee hours of the morning. When 20 tanks escaped, Zamir prepared a second ambush that succeeded in finishing off the Syrian battalion just after dawn the next morning.
Yet another Syrian thrust by two brigades was advancing rapidly on the southern access road in that wide-open sector and inexplicably stopped short in its tracks just before reaching El Al. While some of its units fanned off toward other objectives to the north, a large part of the Syrian force failed to press its advantage, a move that in effect meant that the Syrians just waited for the Israeli reserves to arrive and engage them. A number of theories abound as to why the Syrians would halt their advance in the midst of their momentum, including fear of an ambush on what certainly should have been a heavily defended route, lack of flexibility and initiative once their objectives had been achieved, overextended supply lines and the more far-fetched fear of an Israeli nuclear reprisal in that critical hour. Whatever the true reason, their lack of initiative at a critical moment robbed the Syrians of the chance to reach the Jordan River--and perhaps beyond--virtually unopposed.
In the morning, the Syrians pressed their attack yet again. The few remaining defenders of the Barak Brigade pleaded for air support, which again suffered heavy losses. Ironically, the Syrians helped solve the problem of foiling the anti-aircraft missile threat. After the Syrians fired rockets at Israeli civilian areas, the Chel Ha'Avir (Israel Defense Forces/Air Force, or IDF/AF) responded with reprisal attacks on Syrian infrastructure in Damascus and beyond. To defend against these attacks, the Syrians pulled back some of their missile batteries from the Golan front. Overall, it took the IDF/AF several days to develop tactics and gain experience in defeating Syrian air defense systems, and 27 Israeli aircraft were lost on the Golan front in ground-support missions, as well as scores of others suffering various degrees of damage.
On the morning of October 7, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan toured the Golan front and recognized how critical the situation truly was. Not only were the access routes into the Golan threatened, but also the entire north of Israel. Grasping the very real prospect of a Syrian breakthrough into integral Israel, the minister of defense considered a retreat to a line just forward of the escarpment overlooking the Jordan Valley for a major defensive stand--in effect putting his forces' backs against a wall. Israel prepared to destroy the bridges over the Jordan River to prevent a Syrian breakthrough.
The Syrian 1st Armored Division was advancing up the route toward the Golan HQ at Nafakh. Colonel Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, the Barak Brigade's commander, realized his brigade was for all intents and purposes destroyed. He therefore organized and led a small group of surviving tanks in a holding action that slowed the Syrian advance on his HQ for several hours until he and the rest of the defenders were killed. With the brigade commander dead, no reserves in sight and two Syrian brigades advancing toward the Golan HQ--and with some units having bypassed the base on both flanks--the situation could only be described as grave. Lead elements of the Syrian brigades actually reached Nafakh and broke through the base's southern perimeter. One Syrian T-55 crashed into General Eitan's HQ, only to be knocked out by the last operational tank in Gringold's platoon.
At that point, Eitan evacuated his headquarters to an improvised location farther to the north. Those left to defend the base manned two trackless Centurions from the camp repair depot and fired bazookas in a final stand that knocked out several Syrian tanks until those last Israeli tanks were destroyed.
The 188th Barak Brigade was no more. The Syrians were poised to overrun the Golan headquarters at Nafakh and, seemingly, the entire Golan. That final stand, however, was enough to buy a few crucial additional minutes. While the Syrians paused to regroup after their final opposition had been neutralized, the first Israeli reserve units began reaching what had become the front lines. Finding Syrian tanks milling about their command headquarters, the Israelis immediately opened fire and attacked, dispersing the Syrians.
The arrival of the Israeli reservists spelled the beginning of the end for Syria. For both sides, the war had been about time--the Israelis doing all they could to buy time until their reserves arrived, and the Syrians racing against the clock to achieve their objectives before the Israeli mobilization. While many more bloody battles would take place, those first reserve units coming up the Golan and engaging the Syrians at Nafakh meant that the tide had turned.
The reservists found the Syrians enjoying nearly free reign in the Golan's southern sector. With Syrian tanks advancing along the routes down toward the Jordan River, the critical situation allowed no time to organize divisions and brigades. Instead, platoons and companies of tanks and other units were rushed off to battle as quickly as the forces could be mustered, at times being thrown in against Syrian battalions and even brigades. The fresh Israeli reserve units halted the near--and, in some cases, actual--retreat of what remained of their front-line forces and set about checking the Syrian advance. By midnight on day two of the war, the reserves had managed to stabilize what had been a disintegrating front--with the Syrians having penetrated to areas a mere 10-minute drive from the Jordan River and Sea of Galilee and to less than a kilometer from El Al on the southern access road.
Those gains had not come easily. In spite of their superior numbers, the Syrians' supply lines, extending great distances from their rear areas to points deep into the Golan, had been decimated by the Israeli defenders, and they could no longer replenish and support their forces. Convoys of supplies and reinforcements were under constant attack by the IDF/AF, as well as IDF armor and other ground forces, severely straining the Syrian advance. While the Syrians dug in to consolidate their gains, the Israelis went on the offensive.
Brigadier General Moshe Peled led a division up the Ein Gev road into the center of the southern sector while Maj. Gen. Dan Laner's division moved up the Yehudia road farther to the north--a parallel advance that boxed in the 1st Syrian Armored Division and effectively brought the Syrians' brief conquest to an end. The Syrians fought viciously to free themselves from that pincer movement. A major confrontation near Hushniya camp, which the Syrians had captured the previous night and turned into a forward supply base, ended with hundreds of wrecked, burning and smoldering Syrian tanks and armored vehicles and other vehicles littering the landscape.
By October 10, the Israelis had forced the Syrians back to the antebellum cease-fire line in the southern sector. Well aware of the strong Syrian defensive preparations in the south, Israel chose the northern Golan, with its more difficult, less-defended terrain, as the launching area for its counterattack into Syria itself. Among the units joining the counterattack was the reincarnated Barak Brigade. Since 90 percent of its original commanders had been killed or wounded, Barak's remnants were joined by replacements, reorganized and returned to fighting strength for the counteroffensive that penetrated deep into Syria--until a United Nations-sanctioned cease-fire came into effect on October 23, officially ending hostilities.
source:http://www.eze33.com/brigade/barak.htm
Syrian armor after the war in the valley of tears
Valley of Tears
the Golan Heights 6 October 1973
In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, 180 Israeli tanks and 60 Israeli artillery pieces faced off against 1,200 Syrian tanks and 600 artillery pieces.Each Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli stronghold at Mount Hermon, which had a variety of surveillance equipment.
Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High Command. The fighting in the Sinai was far away that the Israeli population centers were not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall, the Syrians could easily advance towards Tiberias, Safed, Haifa, Netanya, and Tel Aviv. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as possible. They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, without waiting for machine guns to be installed on their tanks, and without taking the time to calibrate their tank guns.
The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.
By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 5 to 1, and in some cases, 11 to 1. Syrian tanks out numbered Israeli tanks 10 to 1) had achieved moderate success. The Israelis put up fierce resistance, as tanks and infantry desperately tried to fend off the Syrians.
The IDF tank reserve crews used the roads to climb to the Golan from the Jordan river using number of roads since they were no trucks available.
Here are some rare pictures taken in 1973 by Mr. Edward Okun at the time
a volentir in a Kibbutz near the Golan.
Steve Smith at the time on a visit in a Kibbutz 1973
A picture of T55 Syrian Army captured in the Golan during the Yom Kippur War
Jerusalem of Gold : the song written in 1967 SIX DAYS WAR
A film of the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967
photo by IDF spokesman 
Pictures taken on "YOM KSHIRUT CHASAN" a contest for the fighting units
by Mr.Nehemia Gershuni at the invitation of "Yad Lashiryon" in Latrun
published here courtesy to "Yad Lashiryon"
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http://www.ngphoto.biz/main/index.php?lang=en
http://www.yadlashiryon.com/
About Yad L'Shiryon- Memorial to fallen soldiers
Located in the Ayalon Valley the former British colonial police fort has been an item of import for over 60 years. Used to dominate both the Israeli and Arab populace during the Mandate period, it's location took on additional importance during Israel's War of Independence. During the war the road to Jerusalem which passed near latrun was often blocked by local arab forces. For the Israeli populace having only recently declared independence in the Jewish areas of the partition, the loss of Jerusalem would be unthinkable. Abdallah of Jordan saw the situation as a means of gaining territory and possibly Mediterranean access. He sent The Arab Legion to take up positions in both the Byzantine old city of Jerusalem as well as Latrun. This effectively blockaded Israeli West Jerusalem.
The new Israeli government knew the situation and attacked the police fort and surrounding areas on three occasions, once getting forces into the fort. Each time however the new Israeli army was pushed back with often grievous losses. The solution was to build a bypass road which is called the 'Burma Road' . This was really nothing more than an improvised, hastily constructed road that enabled supplies to reach western Jerusalem thus breaking the siege and securing Jerusalem as Israel's new capital. Although the fort itself was abandoned by the Legion after the siege had been broken it would remain in Jordanian hands until 1967 when it was liberated by forces of Uzi Narkess's central command.
In 1982 the cornerstone for what would be the memorial and museum was laid. With the help of both sitting and retired officers the museum at Latrun has grown into one of the predominant armour museums in the world. It houses not only examples of IDF vehicles and those captured in it's many wars but examples bought or traded for from around the world. Today the Latrun museum houses over 100 vehicles from pre-WW2 Hotchkiss to prototypes of the Merkava 1,2 and 3. There are an array of soft vehicles as well as examples of bridging and mine clearing apparatus. The museum houses not just the inanimate metal tanks but the histories of its units and individual soldiers. This is a place to stop not just for the armour vehicle enthusiast but for anyone interested in the history of the IDF ground forces. Not unlike Yad V'shem in Jerusalem the museum and monument shows the real cost of defending ones heritage and country....... It's lost future generations
Armor Corps
The Israeli Armor Corps is a corps of the Israel Defense Forces, since 1998 subordinate to GOC Army Headquarters. The Armor Corps is the principal maneuvering corps, and primarily bases its strength on Main Battle Tanks. The Armor Corps is the decisive corps in GOC Army Headquarters, and bases its “crushing power” on its “fists of steel”: a combination of mobility, armor, and firepower. During wars, its role is, on the one hand, to lead the first line of the attacking forces and to clear the area of the enemy, while on the other hand, to block the armor forces of the enemy and to destroy its tanks and armor. During peacetime, it reinforces the Infantry Corps while it performs security tasks, with the tanks serving as a mobile bunker.
Divisions and brigades
The 36th Division
Also known as the Ga’ash Formation, is the largest armor division in the IDF, and also includes Engineering Corps soldiers who are attached to it. It is stationed on the Golan Heights under the Northern Command. . It includes the 7th and 188th Brigades.
The 7th Brigade
Also known as the Sa’ar (”Storm”) Formation, this is a regular armor brigade which is placed under the command of the Northern Command. It is the first armor brigade of the IDF and has participated in all of Israel’s wars. The brigade’s fighting during the Suez War resulted in a breakthrough in how the army approached the character of armor warfare.
Today, the brigade is equipped with Mark 2 Merkava tanks.
The 188 Brigade
Also known as the Barak (”Lightning”) Formation, it is a regular armor brigade which is placed under the command of the Northern Command. Starting with the Six Day War, the brigade participated in all of Israel’s wars. During the Yom Kippur War, the brigade was the first line of defense in the first day of the war at the Southern Golan, and saw almost all of its officers killed in action. It was the last armor brigade to use the Centurion tank, converted into Merkava 3 tanks in 1992.
The 162nd Division
Also known as the Utzvat Ha’Barzel Formation, this is an armor division which is placed under the Central Command.
The 14 Armored Brigade
The brigade was active during the War of Attrition when it split to provide the basis for the 401st Armoured Brigade. During the Yom Kippur War, it was initially an armoured reserve supporting the infantry brigades holding the Bar-Lev Line. It suffered terrible casualties during the war but was rebuilt afterwards.[1]
The 211th Brigade
Also known as the Yishai (acronym for “Guardians of Jerusalem Unit”), during the Lebanon War of 1982, it was famously led by Colonel Eli Geva, who during the Siege of Beirut refused to lead his soldiers into the city for moral reasons. He was dismissed from the army, and the brigade itself was dissolved in the early 1990s.
The 401 Brigade
Also known as the Ikvot Habarzel (”Tracks of Iron”) Formation, this is an armor brigade created in 1968 in order to control the Suez Canal line. During the Yom Kippur War, it faced the first line of attack in the canal and suffered heavy losses. During the 1982 Lebanon War, it fought in the Southern force and one of its battalions participated in the Sultan Yaakov battle. During 2004-2005, the brigade’s tanks were converted into Mark 4 Merkava tanks.
The 847 Brigade
This is a reserve brigade also known as Merkavot Haplada (Steel Chariots), equipped with Mark 2 Merkava tanks. Up to the year 2000 the main equipment was old Magach AFVs. Recently, the brigade took part in the 2006 Lebanon War, most notably in the Battle of Bint Jbeil and battle of Yaroon, in the war the brigade eliminated approximately 60 Hezbollah fighters.
The 460th Brigade
Also known as the Bney Or (”Sons of Light”) Formation, this is the training brigade of the Armor Corps. It maintains two bases: the Shizafon (”tanning”) base, which is the training school for the corps’ commanders, where the officers and tank commanders are instructed. The Magen Sayarim (”Scout Defense”) Camp maintains the armor training school where basic and continued training is undertaken, preparing armor combatants toward the operational brigades.
The 500 Brigade
Also known as the Kfir (”Young Lion”) Formation, this was a regular armor brigade which operated from 1972 until 2003. During the Yom Kippur War, it participated in the battle over the city of Suez. During the Lebanon War of 1982, it fought in the framework of the Eastern force and participated in the Eyn Zhalata battle. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the lessening of the threat from the eastern front, the brigade was dissolved.
Barak Armored Brigade:
Introduction
The Barak Brigade is one of the regular armored brigades of the Northern Command. The Barak Brigade was formed before the establishment of the State of Israel, when it was known as the Carmeli Brigade. It was then an infantry brigade which fought in the north of Israel, from the Western Galilee to kibbutz Manara. Today, the brigade’s symbol is that of the Carmeli brigade, which has been used since the brigade was established. After the establishment of the State, all the independent Jewish fighting units were dismantled, the IDF was created and the Carmeli brigade became the “18th Brigade”. During the Sinai Campaign, the brigade was deployed on the Jordanian border, and therefore did not have an active role in the combat. One of the main conclusions after the war was that the army needed armored units, and the 18th Brigade started the changeover by becoming “the 45th Armored Brigade”.
The brigade commander, Moshe Bar-Kochba (Brill) commanded the brigade in the Six Day War. The brigade received the Eastern sector. The IDF took the initiative to attack, in order to remove the threat of the Long Tom guns on the valley settlements and on the Ramat David airfield. The brigade fought a number of bloody battles in the Dotan Valley, which ended with the blowing up of the Jordan river bridges.
At the start of the 1970s, the brigade participated in armored attacks on terrorist bases in South Lebanon and Syria.
The experiences of the brigade during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 were particularly difficult. At the time, the Barak brigade was the only regular armored force on the Golan Heights. In the light of intelligence reports, the 7th Armored Division was sent to the Golan Heights two days before the outbreak of hostilities. However, the 7th Division soldiers were not familiar with the Golan Heights. The two brigades were spread out is isolated teams along the border line. The Barak brigade was responsible for the Southern Golan Heights sector. The main Syrian efforts to break through the border was in the Southern Golan Heights area, and the ratio of defenders to attackers forces was extremely unfavorable.
During the Yom Kippur War, 112 soldiers from the Barak brigade were killed in action.
After the war the brigade rebuilt itself and later participated in the Litani Campaign and other armored operations.
In the Peace for Galilee War, the brigade led division forces into Lebanon. This war was in built-up areas, hardly the typical combat arena for armor. The brigade fought in the Beirut sector, and participated in the capture of the airport. It then continued to fight in the eastern sector in Lebanon. The brigade participated in all subsequent redeployments stabilizing the lines in the Lebanese sector, and was among the last forces to leave Lebanon.
In recent years, the brigade has changed over from the Centurion tank, which it used for an entire generation, to the ultramodern Merkava Mark 3 main battle tank. This changeover to the best combat tank in the world today has just been completed.
Israel Tal (born 1924), also known as Talik , is an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) general known for his knowledge of tank warfare. Tal was a brigade commander during the Sinai War, an armored-division commander in Sinai Peninsula during the Six Day War, and commander of the southern front during the final stages of the Yom Kipur War.
The Israeli government decided in 1970 that it needed tank-building capacity. General Israel Tal led a development team which took into consideration Israel's battlefield characteristics and lessons learned from previous wars, and began the development and building of Israel's Merkava tank.
Israel Tal's picture appears in Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor "Wall of Greatest Armor Commanders" along with Moshe Peled (also Israeli), Americans George S. Patton and Creighton Abrams and German field-marshal Erwin Rommel.
Tal received the Israel Prize in 1997 for "[A] special contribution to the society and state". In 2002 he was chosen "Knight of Quality Government" by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel in the "Military and security" category.
Armour Doctrine
Gen. Tal is the creator of the Israeli armour doctrine which led to the Israeli successes in the Sinai in the Six Day War. After the Suez Crisis, Tal organized the armour into the leading element of the Israeli Defense Forces, characterized by high mobility and relentless assault. General Tal took over Israeli armor corps in 1964 and re-trained all Israeli gunners to hit targets beyond 1.5km. [1] In open terrain, this long distance gunnery proved vital to survival of Israeli armor corps for subsequent wars. Mobility is comparable to the German Blitzkrieg and many hold it to be an evolution of that tactic. Tal's transformation and success in 1967 led the IDF to expand the role of armour. This led to reduced attention to other less glamorous aspects of the army such as the Infantry. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, excessive focus on fast striking armour left the IDF without adequate defensive ability. Only in latter stages of the war did the armour break out and show its potential when General Ariel Sharon's armour was able to penetrate the Egyptian lines, cross the Suez Canal and envelope the Egyptian 3rd Army near Suez.
While the IDF has become a more balanced force since 1973, Tal's influence on armour doctrine was very important to the IDF's development and has influenced armoured doctrines the world over.
TALIK: Steel Division-Six
Patton Museum Ceremony Honors Major General Israel Tal (Ret.)
Mounted Leader of the Israeli Defence Forces
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צילום:ארכיון משרד הבטחון
צילום:ארכיון צה"ל -משרד הבטחון
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The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 broke out when five Arab nations invaded territory in the former Palestinian mandate immediately following the announcement of the independence of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. In 1947, and again on May 14, 1948, the United States had offered de facto recognition of the Israeli Provisional Government, but during the war, the United States maintained an arms embargo against all belligerents.
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (also known as the Partition Resolution) that would divide Great Britain's former Palestinian mandate into Jewish and Arab states in May 1948. Under the resolution, the area of religious significance surrounding Jerusalem would remain under international control administered by the United Nations. The Palestinian Arabs refused to recognize this arrangement, which they regarded as favorable to the Jews and unfair to the Arab population that would remain in Jewish territory under the partition. The United States sought a middle way by supporting the United Nations resolution, but also encouraging negotiations between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East.
The United Nations resolution sparked conflict between Jewish and Arab groups within Palestine. Fighting began with attacks by irregular bands of Palestinian Arabs attached to local units of the Arab Liberation Army composed of volunteers from Palestine and neighboring Arab countries. These groups launched their attacks against Jewish cities, settlements, and armed forces. The Jewish forces were composed of the Haganah, the underground militia of the Jewish community in Palestine, and two small irregular groups, the Irgun, and LEHI. The goal of the Arabs was initially to block the Partition Resolution and to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state. The Jews, on the other hand, hoped to gain control over the territory allotted to them under the Partition Plan.
After Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, the fighting intensified with other Arab forces joining the Palestinian Arabs in attacking territory in the former Palestinian mandate. On the eve of May 14, the Arabs launched an air attack on Tel Aviv, which the Israelis resisted. This action was followed by the invasion of the former Palestinian mandate by Arab armies from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia sent a formation that fought under the Egyptian command. British trained forces from Transjordan eventually intervened in the conflict, but only in areas that had been designated as part of the Arab state under the United Nations Partition Plan and the corpus separatum of Jerusalem. After tense early fighting, Israeli forces, now under joint command, were able to gain the offensive.
Though the United Nations brokered two cease-fires during the conflict, fighting continued into 1949. Israel and the Arab states did not reach any formal armistice agreements until February. Under separate agreements between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria, these bordering nations agreed to formal armistice lines. Israel gained some territory formerly granted to Palestinian Arabs under the United Nations resolution in 1947. Egypt and Jordan retained control over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively. These armistice lines held until 1967.
Syrian armored truck hit by the IDF near Degania .The Sea of Gallile is in the back along the Golan
The Battles of the Kinarot Valley , is a collective name for a series of military engagements between the Haganah and the Syrian army during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, fought between May 15–22, 1948 in the Kinarot Valley. It includes two main sites: the Battle of Degania-Tzemah, and battles near Masada-Sha'ar HaGolan. The engagements were part of the battles of the Jordan Valley, which also saw fighting against Transjordan in the area of Gesher.
The battles began shortly after the Israeli declaration of independence, when Syria shelled Ein Gev on the night of May 15–16. They were the first military engagement between Israel and Syria. On May 18, Syria attacked the Israeli forward position in Tzemah (Samakh), and on May 20 attacked Degania Alef and occupied Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan. The attack on Degania Alef was a failure, after which the Syrian forces attempted to capture Degania Bet. After reaching a stalemate, they retreated to their initial position in Tel al-Qasr, where they remained until the end of the war.
The campaign was perceived as a decisive Israeli victory, causing reorganizations in the Syrian high command and tales of the heroics in Degania becoming popularized in Israel. However, Syria made a small territorial gain and certain actions were criticized within Israel, such as the retreat from Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan.
The first stage of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, referred to as the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine, started following the ratification of UN Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, which granted Israel the mandate to declare independence. Despite the Arab states' threats on the Jewish population of the British Mandate of Palestine should they declare independence, as well as the American truce offer, the head of the Provisional State Council, David Ben Gurion, declared independence on May 14, 1948. On the night between May 14 and 15, the states of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen invaded the newly-created state.
During the days prior to the declaration of independence, the Arab states surrounding the Mandate of Palestine massed their forces at the borders in preparation for the scenario. According to the Arab plan, the Syrian army was to attack the new state from southern Lebanon and capture Safed. As such, the Syrians massed their forces in that area; however, after they found out that Lebanon did not wish to actively participate in combat, their plans changed to an attack from the southern Golan Heights on Samakh (Tzemah) and later Tiberias. The Syrian force assembled in Qatana on May 1. It moved on May 12 to Beirut and to Sidon on May 13, after which it headed to Bint Jbeil. After the sudden plan change, the force moved to Nabatieh, and proceeded around the Finger of the Galilee to Banias and Quneitra, from which the eventual attack was staged.
According to plan, the Syrians attacked from the southern Golan Heights, just south of the Sea of Galilee through al-Hama and the Yarmouk River, hitting a densely-populated Jewish area of settlement. This came as a surprise to the Haganah,which expected an attack from south Lebanon and Mishmar HaYarden. The Jewish villages on the original confrontation line were Ein Gev, Masada, Sha'ar HaGolan and both Deganias.
On Friday, May 14, the Syrian 1st Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel Abdullah Wahab el-Hakim, was in Southern Lebanon, positioned to attack Malkia. That day Hakim was ordered to return to Syria, move south across the Golan and enter Palestine south of the Sea of Galilee through Tzemah. He began to advance at 9:00 AM on Saturday. He had only two of his battalions, and they were exhausted.
At the onset of the invasion, the Syrian force consisted of a reinforced infantry brigade, supplemented by at least one armored battalion (including Renault R35 tanks) and a field artillery battalion. The troops moved to Kafr Harib and were spotted by Haganah reconnaissance, but because the attack was not expected, the Israeli troops did not attack the invaders.[10] At night between 15 and 16 May, the bulk of the Syrian forces set up camp in Tel al-Qasr in the southwestern Golan. One company with armored reinforcements split up to the south to proceed to the Jewish Water Institute on the Yarmouk riverbank.
The Haganah forces in the area consisted of several units from the Barak (2nd) Battalion of the Golani Brigade, as well as the indigenous villagers, including a reduced Guard Corps (HIM) company at the Tzemah police station. The commander of this force was the deputy of Avraham Yoffe, the battalion commander.On May 13, the battalion commander declared a state of emergency in the area from May 15 until further notice. He authorized his men to seize all necessary arms from the settlements and urged them to dig in and build fortifications as fast as possible, and to mobilize all the necessary work force to do so.
Battles
Breakdown of the battles on May 16
On Saturday night, May 15, the observation posts reported many vehicles with full lights moving along the Golan ridge east of the Sea of Galilee.[15] The opening shots were fired by Syrian artillery on kibbutz Ein Gev at approximately 01:00 on May 16. The following day, the Syrian company which split from the main force attacked the Water Institute, where every worker was killed except one. The company then proceeded towards Sha'ar HaGolan and Masada. Its advance was halted by the village residents as well as a platoon of reinforcements armed with 20 mm cannons. The company retreated to its position and commenced artillery fire on the two kibbutzim. An Israeli reserve unit was called in from Tiberias. It arrived after twenty minutes and took positions around the town. At that point, Tzemach was defended by three platoons from the Barak battalion and reinforcements from neighboring villages.
This development gave the Israeli forces time to organize their defenses at Samakh (Tzemah). During the course of May 16, Israeli gunboats harassed the Syrian positions on the southeastern Sea of Galilee shore. Meanwhile, Syrian aircraft made bombing runs on Masada, Sha'ar HaGolan, Degania Bet and Afikim. The attack on Tzemah resumed on May 17—the Syrians set up their positions in an abandoned British military base just east of the village and in "The Quarantine" (an installation that checked for contaminated cattle), while the Israeli forces entrenched in the actual village and its police station, which had been abandoned by the residents in April 1948, with British escort. A Syrian force attempted to surround the Israelis by crossing the Jordan River to the north of the Sea of Galilee, but encountered a minefield in which a senior Syrian officer was wounded.
This additional reprieve allowed the Israelis to evacuate the children, elderly and sick from the Kinarot Valley, as well as conduct maneuvers which feigned massive reinforcements in the Poria-Alumot region.In the panic of surprise, many men also tried to flee the frontal villages, but blockposts were set up near Afula and Yavne'el by the Military Police Service's northern command, under Yosef Pressman, who personally stopped buses and allowed only the women and children to proceed to safety.
Tzemah
Breakdown of the battles on May 18–19 (Battle of Tzemah)
On the morning of May 18, the Syrian 1st Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier-General Husni al-Za'im and consisting of about 30 vehicles, including tanks, advanced west towards Tzemah (Samakh) in two columns—one across the coast, and another flanking from the south. A contingent was allocated further south, in order to secure the safety of the main force by flanking Sha'ar HaGolan and Masada from the west. It entered a stalemate with a new Israeli position northwest of the two villages. The coastal column shelled the Israeli positions and inflicted enormous damage, due to the Israelis' lack of time to properly dig in. Reinforcements from the Deganias arrived but were immediately hit by the Syrians and did not significantly affect the battle. After the second column reached Tzemah, the Haganah retreated, fearing a cut-off of its retreat route to the Deganias by the latter column. The retreat was disorganized and heavy Israeli casualties were recorded as Tzemah's police station fell.
On the same day, Syrian aircraft bombed the Israeli village Kinneret and the regional school Beit Yerah, on the southwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee. By evening, Tzemah had fallen and a new Israeli defensive line was set up in the Deganias, facing the Syrian counterparts. At night, a Palmach company attempted to recapture Tzemah and assaulted the police station, but were warded off. On the morning of May 19, a message was sent to Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan to prepare for an evacuation, although when the final order was given to stay put, the villages had already been abandoned, mostly to Afikim. At 8:00 AM the Syrian troops captured the villages without a fight. The villages were subsequently looted and destroyed by the Syrians.
The counterattack on the police station failed but delayed the Syrian attack on the Deganias by twenty-four hours. In the evening of May 19, a delegation from the Deganias arrived in Tel Aviv to ask for reinforcements and heavy weapons. One of its members later wrote that David Ben-Gurion told them he could not spare them anything, as "The whole country is a front line". He also wrote that Yigael Yadin, the Chief Operations Officer of the Haganah, told him that there was no alternative to letting the Arabs approach to within twenty to thirty meters of th gates of Degania and fight their tanks in close combat.
Degania Alef
Breakdown of the battles on May 20–22 (Battle of Degania)
After the fall of Tzemah, the Haganah command realized the importance of the campaign in the region, and made a clear separation between the Kinarot Valley and the Battle of Gesher to the south against Transjordan. Moshe Dayan was given command of the Kinarot campaign, and a company of reinforcements from the Gadna program was allocated, along with 3 PIATs. Other reinforcements came in the form of a company from the Yiftach Brigade and another company of paramilitaries from villages in the Lower Galilee and the Jezreel Valley. The Palmach counterattack on the police station on the night of May 18 gave the Israeli forces an additional day to prepare defense and attack plans.
The Israelis called the reinforcements assuming this was the main Syrian thrust. The Syrians were not intending to carry out any further operation south of the Sea of Galilee and planned to make their main effort further north, near the Bnot Ya'akov bridge. On May 19, the Iraqis were about to drive west through Nablus toward Tulkarm, and asked the Syrians to make a diversion in the Degania area to protect their right flank. The Syrians complied, their main objective being to seize the bridge across the river north of Degania Alef, thus blocking any Israeli attack from Tiberias against the Iraqi line of communications.
Heavy Syrian shelling of Degania Alef started at about 04:00 on May 20 from the Tzemah police station, by means of 75 mm cannons, and 60 and 81 mm mortars.[13] At 04:30 on May 20, the Syrian army began its advance on the Deganias and the bridge over the Jordan River north of Degania Alef.[4] Unlike the attack on Tzemah, this action saw the participation of nearly all of the Syrian forces stationed at Tel al-Qasr, including infantry, armor and artillery. The Israeli defenders numbered about 70 persons. At night, a Syrian expeditionary force attempted to infiltrate Degania Bet, but was caught and warded off, which caused the main Syrian force to attack Degania Alef first.[1] At 06:00, the Syrians started a frontal armored attack, consisting of 5 tanks, a number of armored vehicles and an infantry company.[4] The Syrians pierced the Israeli defense, but their infantry was at some distance behind the tanks. The Israelis knocked out four Syrian tanks and four armored cars with 20 mm cannons, PIATs and Molotov cocktails.[21] Meanwhile, other defenders kept small arms fire on the Syrian infantry, who stopped in citrus groves a few hundred meters from the settlements. The surviving Syrian tanks withdrew back to the Golan.[18] They left behind a number of lightly damaged or otherwise inoperable tanks that the Israelis managed to repair.
Degania Bet
Despite the Syrian superiority in numbers and equipment, the destruction of a multitude of armored vehicles and the infantry's failure to infiltrate Degania Alef was the likely cause for the retreat of the main Syrian force to Tzemah. A less-organized and sparsely-numbered armored and infantry force forked off to attack Degania Bet.[1] Eight tanks, supported by mortar fire, moved within 400 yards of the settlement defense, where they stopped to provide fire support for an infantry attack. The Syrians made to failed attempts to breach the Israeli small arms fire defense and gave up the attempt.
While the battle was taking place, a delegation from the Deganias travelled to the government headquarters in Tel Aviv to request weapons and reinforcements. The General Staff Chief of Operations Yigael Yadin denied the request, but was compelled to provide (for just 24 hours) four newly-received Napoleonchik field cannons, by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. The artillery reached the front in the middle of the day and was placed on the Poria-Alumot range.[1] It was the first Israeli artillery to be used in the war.[23] While the soldiers who operated the cannons (still lacking sights) were not proficient in handling them, an acceptable level of accuracy was achieved after practice shots into the Sea of Galilee. The artillery fire took the Syrian army by complete surprise, and the latter decided to regroup and retreat to Tel al-Qasr, also recalling the company at Sha'ar HaGolan and Masada.
There were two reasons for the Syrian withdrawal. A Palmach battalion from the Yiftach Brigade had been sent by boat during the previous night across the sea to Ein Gev. It climbed up the Golan and carried out a counter raid at dawn on Kafr Harib, threatening the line of communications of the 1st Brigade. The second reason was that they were running out of ammunition: Husni al-Za'im had been promised replenishment, and attacked Degania short of ammunition. Za'im ordered a withdrawal when his troops ran out of ammunition. The replenishment was instead sent to the 2nd Brigade further north. The Israelis were not aware of this, and attributed the Syrian withdrawal to surprise at the Israeli artillery fire.
Aftermath and effects
On May 21, Haganah troops returned to Tzemah and set up fortifications,[1] The damaged tanks and armored cars were gathered and taken to the rear. The settlers returned that night to identify the bodies of their comrades in the fields and buried them in a common grave in Degania.[24] At dawn on May 21, the Golani staff reported that the enemy was repelled but that they were expecting another attack. The full report read:
“ Our forces repelled yesterday a heavy attack of tanks, armored vehicles and infantry that lasted about 8 hours. The attack was repelled by the brave stand of our men, who used Molotov cocktails and their hands against the tanks. 3" mortars and heavy machinery took their toll on the enemy. Field cannons caused a panicked retreat of the enemy, who yesterday left Tzemah. This morning our forces entered Tzemah and took a large amount of booty of French ammunition and light artillery ammunition. We have captured 2 tanks and an armored vehicle of the enemy. The enemy is amassing large reinforcements. We are expecting a renewal of the attack.
On May 22, villagers returned to Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan, which had been largely destroyed. Expecting another attack, reinforcements from the Carmeli Brigade took up positions in the two villages.
Preserved Renault R35 tank captured by Israel in Degania. The PIAT's hit can be seen at the top of the turret.
In the wake of the fall of Gush Etzion, news of Degania's successful stand (as well as that of Kfar Darom) provided a morale boost for other Israeli villages. The success of the Napoleonchik field cannons prompted the Israeli high command to re-use two of them in attempts to capture Latrun. The flight from Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan, on the other hand, stirred controversy in the young state, fueled by news of the Kfar Etzion massacre just days before, and the Palmach issued a newsletter accusing them of abandoning national assets, among other things. These accusations were subsequently repeated in media and in a play by Yigal Mossensohn, and a campaign was started by the villagers to clear their name.
The battles of the Kinarot Valley were the first and last of the major ground engagements between Israel and Syria to the south of the Sea of Galilee, although minor patrol skirmishes continued until the first ceasefire. Despite the Syrians holding Tel al-Qasr, which was part of the British Mandate of Palestine and the Jewish state according to the UN partition of 1947, the offensive was considered a decisive Syrian defeat by both sides. The Syrian defense minister Ahmad Sharabati and Chief of Staff Atafa blamed each other, the latter resigning and the former being dismissed by the prime minister as a result of the battle.
First tank kill controversy
The first Syrian tank damaged near Degania Alef's gates, which has been preserved on the location, was the subject of a historiographic dispute when Baruch "Burke" Bar-Lev, a retired IDF colonel and one of Degania's native defenders at the time, claimed that he was the one who stopped the tank with a Molotov cocktail However, his account was rebutted by an IDF Ordnance Corps probe, which in 1991 determined that a PIAT shot had killed the tank's crew. Shlomo Anschel, a Haifa resident who also participated in the battle, told Haaretz in 2007 that the tank was hit by PIAT fire from a Golani soldier, and that the Molotov cocktail could not possibly have hit the crew
Renault R35
Type Light tank
Place of origin France
Service history
Used by Syria during 1948 war
Production history
Designed 1934
Manufacturer Renault
Produced 1936-1944
The Renault R35, an abbreviation of Char léger Modèle 1935 R or R 35, was a French light infantry tank of the Second World War. Designed in the mid-1930s, it was the most numerous French tank in the early stages of the conflict. It was also used by other armies and sold to Syria in large numbers
The 65t Merkava 4 main battle tank entered full production in 2001 and began operational training with the Israel Defence Force in July 2003. The first battalion of Merkava Mk 4 tanks entered service with the Israel Defence Forces in 2004.
"The Merkava 4 main battle tank is operational with the Israel Defence Force."
The Ministry of Defence plan to manufacture between 50 and 70 Merkava 4 tanks a year and up to 400 tanks may be manufactured in total, although budgetary constraints put these numbers in doubt. The Merkava 4 has been extensively improved including new armour protection and gun and electronics systems.
The Merkava 4 is slightly larger than the Merkava 3 Baz, which has been in service with the IDF since 1990. The Merkava 3 is offered for export by SIBAT based in Tel Aviv. The Merkava 4 is not offered for export but the systems and components are exported.
The tank is capable of carrying eight infantry soldiers, a command group or three litter patients (stretcher casualties) in addition to the tank crew of commander, loader, gunner and driver. The tank is capable of firing on the move at moving targets and has demonstrated high hit probability in firing against attack helicopters using conventional anti-tank munitions.
Major contractors include: the El Op Electro-Optic Industries subsidiary of Elbit Systems which is responsible for the fire control system; the Israel Defence Force which carries out main construction and system integration and testing; Israel Military Industries for the supply of the main gun, ballistic protection and munitions; Imco Industries for the electrical systems; Urdan Industries for the hull, main turret and castings; and IAI Ramta for protection components.
The main part of the tank production, the construction of the hull and integration of all the systems is carried out in the Israel Defence Force workshop.
Merkava 4 battle tank weaponry
The Merkava 4 has a new all-electric turret developed by Elbit and subsidiary El-Op. Only one hatch is installed in the turret, the commander's hatch.
The improved 120mm smooth-bore gun has been developed by Israel Military Industries.
"The improved Merkava 4 battle tank gun can fire higher power munitions including new 120mm high-penetration projectiles and guided shells."
The new gun is an advanced generation of the gun developed for the Merkava 3. A Vidco thermal shroud on the gun reduces bending of the barrel resulting from environmental and firing conditions. The gun can fire higher power munitions including new 120mm high-penetration projectiles and guided shells.
The loader can select semi-automatically the ammunition type. The tank carries 48 rounds of ammunition each stored in a protective container. An electrically operated revolving magazine contains 10 ready-to-fire rounds.
The range of ammunition includes APFSDS-T M711 (CL 3254), the HEAT-MP-T M325 (CL 3105) and the TPCSDS-T M324 (CL 3139) supplied by the Ammunition Group of Israel Military Industries. The gun is also capable of firing French, German or US 120mm rounds.
The tank is fitted with 7.62mm machine guns and an internally operated 60mm mortar system developed by Soltam Ltd. The mortar can fire explosive and illumination rounds to a range of 2,700m.
The protection suite includes an advanced electromagnetic threat identification and warning system.
El Op fire control
The new fire control system, developed by El Op, includes very advanced features including the capability to acquire and lock onto moving targets, even airborne helicopters, while the tank itself is on the move.
The computer-controlled fire control system includes line-of-sight stabilisation in two axes, a second-generation television sight and automatic thermal target tracker, a laser range finder, an improved thermal night vision system and a dynamic cant angle indicator.
The commander's station is fitted with a stabilised panoramic day and night sight. The integrated operating system includes advanced data communications and battle management. Tadiran developed the Merkava's communications system, the inter communication system and the VRC 120 vehicular transceiver radio with embedded auxiliary receivers
"The Merkava 4's sensors include radar with four antennas placed around the vehicle."
Countermeasures
The tank is fitted with the Amcoram LWS-2 laser warning system, with threat warning display installed at the commander's station. This links to the Israel Military Industries POMALS (pedestal-operated multi-ammunition launching system) decoy launcher. One launcher is fitted on either side of the tank, which can launch smoke grenades and decoys.
A Merkava 4 has also been fitted with the Rafael Trophy Active Protection System.
Trophy provides 360° coverage against anti-tank rockets, anti-tank missiles and tank HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) rounds. Once Trophy has detected a threat, it is tracked and classified and the optimal intercept point is computed, prior to launching a countermeasure.
Sensors include radar with four antennas placed around the vehicle. The system development was completed in April 2007 and the IDF has approved production for fitting on new Merkava tanks.
The Trophy system entered low-rate initial production (LRIP) in June 2008 and is planned to achieve initial operating capability in late 2009.
GD 883 V-12 diesel engine
The Merkava 4 is powered by a V-12 diesel engine rated at 1,500hp. The engine compartment and one fuel tank are at the front of the tank and two fuel tanks are at the back. The new engine represents a 25% increase in power compared to the 1,200hp powerpack installed on the Merkava 3.
The German company MTU manufactures the engine components and the GD 883 engine is manufactured under licensed production by General Dynamics Land Systems in the USA. The engine is transferred to Israel for installation and integration with the automatic transmission and with the engine computer control system. The tank has automatic five-gear transmission rather than four gears as in the Merkava 3. The transmission system is manufactured by Renk. The single position rotary shock absorbers are installed externally.
Hull
The redesign of the hull around the installation of the new powerpack has provided improved frontal armour protection and improvement to the driver's field of view. For improved reverse driving the driver uses a camera.
"The Merkava 4 is powered by a V-12 diesel engine rated at 1,500hp."
A new feature of the tank is that the fitted modular special armour covers the turret. The tank is protected against a range of threats, including air-launched precision-guided missiles and advanced and top-attack anti-tank weapons. Automatic fire detection and suppression has been installed. The underside of the hull has been fitted with additional armour protection against mines.
The driver and crew compartments are equipped with heating and cooling air conditioning and a Shalon Chemical Industries combined individual and overpressure protection systems against contamination
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